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In the "lost decade" of the 1980*8 (as it came to be 
known), many Latin American countries languished under the 
twin burdens of a crushing foreign debt and runaway 
inflation. In many places, this crisis was being faced by 
fragile, newly installed democracies.
Settling on a solution was difficult because the 
governments were being pulled in several different 
directions at the same time. Foreign banks demanded that 
loans made to the preceding military regimes be repaid in 
full otherwise any additional, much-needed credit would be 
withheld. In addition, the loans were contingent upon the 
adoption of strict monetary measures (deflationary and 
recessive, such policies were intended to bring 
stabilization through "controlling public deficit and 
aggregate demand"1) • Recalcitrant trade unions opposed 
this. Rather than bleed the economy white by sending 
capital abroad, they felt it was better to keep the money 
and invest it at home with government spending and wage 
increases.2
The cause of all of Latin America's fiscal diffi­
culties was the subject of debate as well. Economists were 
divided into two camps: structuralists and monetarists.
Both groups agreed that inflation was related to the 
increase in the supply of money, but the "monetarist answer 
to the question of why the money supply has increased
1
revolve® around the notion of financial irresponsibility! 
while the answer of the structuralist is that the hands of 
the authorities are forced by exogenous circumstances.1,3 
Did inflation go on to cause the balance of payments crisis 
or was it the other way around? Structuralists and 
monetarists disagree on that, too.
Austerity versus spending, structuralism versus 
monetarism; ultimately the governments of Argentina and 
Brazil would try to split the difference between these 
various interests. In the early 1980's, the "gradualist" 
approach attempted to reconcile austerity with spending. 
Combating inflation while simultaneously "fostering 
economic growth and income redistribution"4 did not seem to 
work, so both the Argentine and Brazilian governments 
decided to take more drastic action.
Rather than follow the "orthodox" monetary approach 
favored by the foreign banks and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), both governments tried to again come down in 
the middle with a mix of monetarist and structuralist 
policies; a "heterodox" stabilization plan.3
In Argentina, this program was called the "Austral 
Plan" while the similar "Cruzado Plan" was adopted in 
Brazil. What led to their development? What did they 
consist of? How did they perform?
2
Structuralism vs. Monstarism:
The Great Debate in Latin America*
Argentina and Brasil’s heterodox programs were a 
combination of elements from the two somewhat divergent 
structural and monetary schools.
Structuralists. This structuralist theory came from 
economists in ECLA, the Economic Commission on Latin 
America. It said that inflation was the result of a 
balance of payments crisis with the developed world. With 
their foreign currency reserves depleted, countries had a 
diminished "capacity to import1'6 and were forced to begin 
import substitution.
Producing their own locally manufactured goods meant 
rapid industrialization and urbanization. The increased 
population in the cities led to a greater demand for food 
there and thus a higher price. But instead of a supply- 
and-demand reaccion in the rural areas to produce more 
food, little resulted.7
Why? Many farms in the existing structure of Latin 
America fall into one or two categories: a 1stifundio (a 
large estate) or a mlnifundio (often a subsistence plot). 
The owners of the latlfundia were not entrepreneurs and had 
no interest in increasing output (since they were already 
extremely wealthy) while the mlnifundio farmers, who may 
have wanted to produce more, were unable because they did 
not have enough land, lacked the necessary modern machinery
3
and could not gat credit.8 Thus output remained the same 
despite higher food prices.
The structuralists vent on to say that it was due to 
this inelastic supply curve that food prices would increase 
to the point where workers would demand higher wages to 
compensate for it. Obviously, higher wages would lead the 
price of manufactured goods up and start the Inflationary 
cycle. Moreover, the lack of competition from cheap 
imports left prices free to skyrocket.9
The structuralist solution? Inflationary pressure had 
started because of the unresponsive, archaic structure of 
agriculture so changes through land reforms would be needed 
to remedy Minefficiency on the minifundia level,. • .low 
land utilization on the latifundia level"10 and make the 
countryside more amenable to the needs of the urban 
population.11
In addition, some inflation may take care of itself. 
Rapid industrialization and urbanization means a greater 
need for infrastructure, and in order to build more 
infrastructure the government must run deficits, causing 
some inflation. But in the end this will be paid for with 
the economic growth from the new industry and populace. So 
perhaps, not all inflation is bad.12
ttQnitarlgtg* Where the structuralists had felt that the 
balance of payments crisis caused inflation, monetarists
4
saw it the other way around; inflation had caused the 
balance of payments crisis.
Mostly associated with the IMF, monetarists believed 
that inflation was due to a country's central Bank being 
abused by its government. In Latin America, rather than 
being independent the Central Bank is usually subordinate 
to the government's Finance Ministry. Kather than raise 
taxes or cut spending in the face of a deficit, governments 
will "borrow" money from their Central Bank as an easy way 
out.13 In essence, the bank prints more money and inflates 
the currency.
Once inflation starts to flare up, government 
continues with the "no pain" approach to combat it. Public 
utilities and state enterprises are not allowed to increase 
their prices with inflation in an effort to keep the cost 
of living down. The government might even force a state 
enterprise with a good reputation to borrow money on the 
world market. As a result, public utilities will 
eventually begin to lose money and need government 
subsidies to make up for it, adding to the deficit. State 
enterprises forced to take v->n debts will have to make 
payments and efficiency suffers as a result.14
If exchange rates are fixed, domestic inflation will 
make imports relatively cheap and exports less competitive 
as the country's inflated currency becomes overvalued on 
the world market. Much to the chagrin of wealthy
5
agricultural exporters, governments were loathe to devalue 
their currency for fear of the sudden increase in the price 
of imports fueling inflation. If a currency is left 
overvalued for long the resulting trade deficit will 
evaporate foreign currency reserves and lead to a balance 
of payments crisis.19
Impact Qt..Inflation» Regardless of what had caused it# 
inflation was well on its way to destroying the economics 
of Brazil and Argentina. It had caused a misallocation of 
resources as people tried to protect themselves against 
unstable prices.16 In an effort to become as illiquid as 
possible, land and other non-perishable goods were bought 
and thus savings were placed in non-productive resources.
In many casesf capital simply left the country altogether.
Also, to the detriment of the economy, businesses 
limited themselves to involvement in short-gestation 
projects since starting to produce quickly was a safeguard 
against the uncertainty of the future. Long-term projects 
were rare.17
Penalties for delinquent tax payments in some Latin 
Mnerican countries are not too severe, so in an 
inflationary economy the longer one waits to pay the 
better. Paying with inflated currency means the taxpayer 
saves and government loses. It loses revenues and thus 
ends up with an even bigger deficit.1®
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How would Argentina and Brazil go about correcting
these problems?
The Austral Plan
Background. In December 1983, Raul Alfonsin inherited an 
economy that was in a shambles. Argentina was stagnating 
under a $45 billion debt and fast approaching 
hyperinflation. Things had not been so bad in half a 
century.
Alfonsin's political strength was quite ephemeral, 
owing less to his Radical Party's popularity than to the 
aberrant unpopularity of the Peronists, who were rumored 
during the campaign to have engaged in talks with the 
despised outgoing military regime.
In order for the Radicals to build upon their toehold 
on power, the economy would have to be turned around in a 
hurry. An IMF-style plan for stabilization was avoided at 
first, to placate the powerful trade unions and keep the 
population in support of the government's policies.19
But why would Economy Minister Bernardo Grinspun's 
avoiding an IMF stabilization program be a popular mov • ? 
Because, to quote Werner Baer, an IMF plan:
consisted of a combination of: 
currency devaluation, reduction of 
import controls, credit restrictions, 
reduction of government subsidies on 
basic consumer goods (including fuel 
and basic foods), higher public utility 
prices (electricity, telephone, urban 
transportation, etc.), higher taxes,
7
wage repression, reductions of public 
employment, reduction of government 
investments, etc.20
Just imagining the public wrath over an electricity 
rate hike alone would give any elected government (perhaps 
even some unelected ones) pause, so not surprisingly 
Argentina tried to avoid acquiescing to the IMF's demands.
There was no way to continue down this path, however. 
Argentina could no longer make payments on the principal of 
its foreign debt in early 1984, and before the year was out 
announced a suspension of interest payments as well. While 
it was popular to defy the IMF, the country was in need of 
a bailout and no foreign bank would extend any credit 
unless the IMF recommended it. Alfonsin, in September 
1984, was forced to sign on to a standby agreement.
By February 1985 Grinspun and the Central Bank 
Governor, Enrique Garcia Vasquez had resigned as a protest 
against the IMF stabilization recommendations and were 
replaced respectively by Juan Sorrouille and Jose Luis 
Machinea.
Grinspun and Vasquez were not the only people opposed 
to the IMF agreement. The trade unions (most of whose 
loyalties were with the opposition Peronists) were out to 
torpedo the pact and force the government to give in to 
their demands for a wage increase and additional government 
spending.
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Alfonsin's difficulties with the trade unions went 
back to his effort to change the existing labor laws and 
usurp some of the unions' power. So not only were the 
unions against the IMF agreement for philosophical reasons, 
they opposed it out of malice as well. In any event, they 
succeeded in getting the wage increases and government 
spending they desired and ruined the agreement.
It was not long after the first wage increases were 
promised that the austerity program Argentina was 
attempting to implement collapsed and the IMF withdrew its 
support and suspended all new loans.
The stop and go gradualist policies of the past had to 
be abandoned and replaced with a dramatic, new approach 
that would stop Argentina's spiraling inflation dead in its 
tracks and impress upon the IMF and foreign banks that 
Buenos Aires was serious about stabilization and deserving 
of desperately needed funds. The government decided on a 
shock treatment.
The Government Shift Policies. Recognizing that the 
gradualist approach was not working, but not wanting to 
institute a standard IMF program (i.e. a monetarist 
solution), Sorrouille assembled a team of advisors 
(Machinea, Mario Brodherson, Adolfo Canitrot, and Roberto 
Frenkel) to construct a program modeled after the Weimar 
Republic's success in combating hyperinflation.21 From the 
beginning, avoiding hyperinflation was the group's main
9
concern and not the total elimination of inflation.22 
After studying the plans enacted by the Germans in the 
1930s, the group concluded that their earlier attempts at 
stabilization had failed for three reasons.
1. M[A]n inability to understand the structural 
problems of the Argentine economy.1,23 There were four main 
structural problems: "supply inelasticities, relative price 
oscillations, thn generalization of indexation, and the 
endogenous character of part of the fiscal deficit and 
monetary behavior.1,24
Supply inelasticities, such as the example of the 
supply of food used above, not or.iy helped fuel inflation 
but caused the second structural problem of relative price 
oscillations. With supplies of goods unresponsive to 
changes in price and all parties conscious of their eroding 
real income, a "fight for shares", as Werner Baer calls it, 
ensued. With everyone trying to raise their prices before 
the other guy did, something called "inertial inflation" 
was generated.25 Inertial Inflation, many economists felt, 
was purely psychological and made matters seem much worse 
than they actually were.
The generalization of indexation was a form of "pay­
back" for the government, which had in effect been caught 
in its own trap. Before indexation, governments could use 
inflation as an invisible tax, devaluing money right out of 
a workers paycheck (true, there were periodic wage
10
increases, but in the interim the government stood to make 
a siphoned-off fortune). In addition, anyone who bought 
bonds got bilked since by the time it matured it was worth 
less than the initial investment.26
After indexation was introduced, wages and bonds were 
adjusted for inflation and the government was left holding 
the bag (and forced to increase the deficit).
As far as fiscal and monetary policies being 
endogenously caused by inflation, consider the tax evasion 
example above. In Argentina, only 32.7 percent of 
registered taxpayers filed returns "and of tHose only 13 
percent paid taxes.1,27 The Olivera-Tanzi effect was in 
full bloom there. In other words, the higher inflation 
went, the longer people would evade paying taxes and the 
greater the deficit would become. Monetary cause maintains 
that anytime a government devalues its currency, it causes 
its foreign and local debt to become more expensive to 
service and thus increases the deficit.
2. "[T]he incompleteness of the policy measures
previously adopted."20 Sorrouille and his team of experts 
were convinced that in the face of inertial inflation, 
"traditional austerity programs would result in severe 
recessions without stopping inflation"29 (since the 
inflation was psychological). In addition to IMF-style 
wage restrictions, a price freeze would be required as 
well.
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3. M[ I Inconsistency in implementing such policies,1,30 
Trade unions and the temptation to inflate the currency 
were most often what broke the will of the government.
This time they would have to resist the pressure and avoid 
previous stop-and-go experiences with economic reforms.
How could the government institute policies that would 
succeed where others had failed for the above three 
reasons?
One way would be to build a consensus between 
government, business and labor; the other would be to just 
spring a plan on the country by executive order with no 
prior warnings or consultations.
Alfonsin chose the surprise announcement route 
since reaching a consensus with the intransigent labor 
movement bordered on fantasy and any pre-announced price 
freeze would lead to eleventh-hour price spirals. Of 
course, going it alone meant that no other group had 
invested political capital in the program and therefore 
could decry it at the first indication it was at risk of 
going sour, but it also meant that the Radical party would 
not have to share the credit. The 1985 elections were 
coming up and if the program was successful the UCR could 
build on its absolute majority in the lower house of 
Congress, perhaps eventually even taking the Senate and 
wresting some governorships from the Peronists. A lot was 
riding on it.
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The first austerity measures were enacted by the 
government a few days before the main body of the plan, it 
was the equivalent of taking advantage of inside 
information at a stock exchange.
The coming price freeze would not completely eliminate 
the inflation so the currency would over time become 
overvalued. To pre-empt this, the government devalued the 
peso. In addition, many public utility rates were raised 
to adjust for inflation before the freeze locked them into 
unprofitability. Private companies were not so lucky.
Announcement. The Austral Plan was announced on June 14, 
1985 and would attack inflation on three fronts: fiscal
policy, monetary policy and wage and price policy.
Flag,ft,1.Policy- This was a standard monetarist deficit
reduction plan aimed at reducing a revenue shortfall which 
had reached 12.8 percent of GNP by 1984.31
It called for a revamping of Argentina's thoroughly 
inadequate tax collection system32 and included tougher 
penalties for tax cheats. Tax collection would also be 
aided by the lower inflation brought on by the Austral Plan 
because any windfall from putting off paying taxes would 
evaporate. Recently increased public utility rates were 
raised again, as well as taxes on international trade.
In addition to all the tax increases, spending cuts 
would be needed to bring down the deficit. The Austral
13
Plan called for cessation of government hiring and firings 
of people with patronage jobs.
Monetary Policy. Here is where the economic planners got 
creative. Some elements were still standard fare but 
represented a break with the past for Argentina.
The government swore off inflating the currency as a 
means of financing deficits. This measure is at the heart 
of monetarist theory and had never been adhered to by 
Argentina. From June 14, 1985 on, whatever deficit was 
left over after the fiscal policies were enacted would be 
financed with foreign borrowing.
Monetarism has no provisions for inertial inflation, 
however, so Sorrouille's team broke with tradition and 
enacted programs based on structuralism to fight it. 
Inertial inflation, it was felt, was a psychological 
phenomenon so something that broke the inflationary mindset 
was needed.
First, a new currency, the austral was introduced to 
impress upon the populace that this was a real change in 
direction. The austral's exchange rate was fixed at $1.25 
with 1 austral equalling 1000 pesos.
Secondly, in an effort to keep from penalizing 
businesses and to quell the demands for new rounds of price 
increases, "deindexation" was introduced. Contracts 
concluding after June 14 had expected 30 percent inflation 
to continue and it was figured into the price. With
14
inflation now expected to be zero, inflation compensation 
needed to be taken out.
Finally interest rate ceilings were imposed. Only 
time deposits and fixed rate credits would have their 
original interest rates respected. All other transactions* 
interest rates were dropped to accommodate lower inflation 
and prevent bank failures.
Wage and Price Policy. Monetarists frequently recommended 
wage restrictions but never a price freeze. The IMF 
traditionally opposed price freezes, too.
Nevertheless, the Austral Plan called for a wage and 
price freeze, including the exchange rate (just devalued) 
and the prices of public services (which had just been 
increased) at June 12 levels. Only a few seasonal goods 
were allowed to fluctuate.
While wages were boosted 23 percent, it was to make up 
for the purchasing power that had been lost to inflation 
during the first 14 days of June, government made it clear 
though, that this would be the last increase for some time.
Some parts ordinary, some extraordinary (a new 
currency, deindexation, wage and price freezes), the 
Austral Plan was introduced to the IMF in the hopes that it 
would convince them to recommend extending credit to 
Argentina. Credit which was critical since it was what 
Argentina planned to pay its residual deficit with. A 
letter of intent was signed stating that the IMF would
15
issue a $1.2 billion loan if the U.S. issue done for $470 
million. In return, Argentina would continue to run trade 
surpluses (that would be used to pay back its foreign debt) 
and try to keep inflation down.
Implementation and Performance. The Austral Plan ran its 
course over 2 years 3 months and in five distinct phases: 
initial shock, relaxation, money crunch, "Australito" and 
liberalization.
Initial Shock (Juno 1985-March 1986). At first the Austral 
Plan was a rousing success. Inflation dropped form 30.5 
percent in June to 6 percent in July and 3 percent in 
August.
Even inertial inflation seemed broken. Confidence in 
the austral was reflected by the increases in bank deposits 
and a decrease in spending. Stable prices seemed to agree 
with everyone.33
But inflation was still present to some degree and, 
ironically, one reason for it was the new found confidence 
in the economy . There was a large inflow of Argentine 
capital from abroad. Inflation was also fueled by a 
reduction in bank reserve requirements; freeing up the 
banks to loan out more money into the system and keep 
interest rates down by helping satisfy the increasing 
demand for money.
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In addition, government activities were contributing 
to inflation. Some public enterprises could not make the 
interest payments on their external debt so the Central 
Bank made the payments in their behalf. While not an 
outright violation of the government pledge not to print 
money, it was still a violation in spirit.54 The Central 
Bank had also refinanced half the interest payments on the 
foreign debt and rediscounted commercial bank paper (mostly 
to local governments).55
Not surprisingly, the Central Bank and government 
deficits were larger than expected. The fiscal deficit was 
supposed to decline to 2.5 percent of GNP in 1985 and white 
increased tax revenues (from 17.17 percent GNP to 21.56 and 
23.03 percent by the third and fourth quarters) helped 
bring third and fourth quarter deficits down around 2.1 and 
2.4 percent of GNP respectively, the deficit for 1985 ended 
up being 6.3 percent.56 Still, this was not bad 
considering the deficit was nearly 13 percent of GNP the 
previous year.
The government did manage to run a surplus in trade 
though, to the tune of $2 billion from July to December
1985. The problem with this was that it was not due to 
growth in exports, rather it was a drop in imports due to 
recession.57
Recession had, in fact, persisted. But the conquest 
of inflation had impressed the voters immensely and the
17
Radicals were rewarded with gains at the polls. More 
importantly, their chief rivals, the Peronists, had 
slipped. If they could keep the program rolling, they 
would be able to capture several governorships in 1987.
Things were looking up for the economy. By early 1986 
it looked as if a recovery might be on the horizon, in 
spite of still-high interest rates. The government had a 
problem: should they break with the program and increase 
the money supply for the sake of reducing interest rates, 
even at the risk of rekindling inflation?38
This risk was a large one because there was already a 
great deal of inflationary pressure. One reason was 
because of the effect the price freeze had had on the 
market. Those businesses which had increased prices just 
before the Austral Plan were (in a sense) winners, because 
they were able to charge the actual price of their product. 
Businesses which had been getting ready to adjust for 
inflation were losers because now, on account of the 
freeze, they could not raise prices and were destined to 
lose money for the duration.39
The government had been aware of this result which is 
why utility rates were increased before the freeze. Also, 
since they hoped to avoid problems with the population, 
wages had been adjusted. By 1986, however, unions were 
beginning to demand wage increases to compensate for the 
low-level inflation (20.2 percent) that had persisted since
18
June 1985. Businesses caught by the price freeze wanted 
reindexation of prices.
Another reason for inflationary pressure was the 
increase in the prices of seasonal goods. People were 
demanding compensation not only for this but because of the 
widespread belief that many people were getting raises 
under the table (which seemed to run against the 
population's "zero-sum mentality").40
The initial shock had gotten great results, but the 
freeze was never meant to last forever and the point of 
diminishing returns was being reached in many phases of the 
operation.
Had inertial inflation truly been beaten? Despite 
increased savings and other evidence that it had, there was 
still the prevailing inertial attitude in society that 
anyone else's gain was your loss. Lifting the freeze would 
give the structuralists their answer.
Relaxation (April 1986-Auqust 1986). Not only were 
interest rates high, inflation had left the austral 
overvalued in the world market (since its exchange rate had 
been fixed) and had led to a decline in the trade surplus.
So on April 4, 1986 the government announced the end 
of shock treatment and *~he start of growth with "controlled 
rates of inflation."41
19
Fiscal Policy: Loss of revenue due to the Olivera-Tanzi
effect had peaked at 3.9 percent of the GNP in 1985 and was 
on the way down.42 Still, the deficit persisted and prices 
charged by public enterprises were increased to help close 
the gap (some had been losing money, too).
Monetary Policy. The government continued to abstain from 
issuing money to finance the deficit, but there was a 
growth in the money supply of 5 percent a month in an 
effort to bring down interest rates. Also the government 
devalued the austral by 3.75 percent to help trade.43
Wage and Price Policy. Wages for state employees were 
increased by 5 percent for the second quarter and 8.5 
percent for private employees. Indexation was reinstituted 
but the economic planners, in an effort to thwart inertial 
inflation, set price adjustments at longer intervals.
While easy money did help lower interest rates and 
promote economic growth (6.1 percent and 11.7 percent 
growth in the second and third quarters of 1986, 
respectively), it also combined with indexation to fuel 
inflation. Things were quickly getting out of control.
Indexation was driving wages beyond the government's 
original guidelines. Government gave in to union demands 
for a 30 percent wage increase in the final quarter of
1986. Such policies, in effect, caused an inertial 
inflation explosion.
20
Monetary growth and indexation had proved to be a 
deadly combination, but it was not too late to tighten tha 
money supply, abandon indexation and correct the mistakes 
made. The question was, did government have the political 
courage to do it? Half-actions would not help.
The (September l28„ir£^ £,ua£Y...12$ 11 . The
governments return to tight money failed to reduce 
inflation because continuing indexation was fueling the 
inertial side.
Indexation had been revamped and was comprised of 
three groups of goods and services: Wage goods, indexed 
every 45 days; Industrial goods, indexed every month; and 
Non-state supplied services whose prices were left free.44
Fiscal Policy. The government abandoned its commitment not 
to finance the deficit through money supply increases (it 
used "some sterilized deposits that the public sector held 
in banks”45) and inflation was a 7 percent by February
1987.
Monetary Policy. Since a trade surplus was vital, the 
exchange rate was perfectly indexed while. . .
Wage and Price Policy. Wage goods and industrial goods 
were "underindexed,” that is adjusted below the inflation 
rate in an effort to slow the inertial complement. 
Restrictive money policy was what the government hoped
21
would sufficiently brake the prices of non-state supported 
services.
Whatever economic activity had been starting earlier 
in the >sar seemed to be fading. In December 1986, 
industrial activity had slipped to August 1985 levels and 
led to an increased shortfall in tax revenues. Once 
inflation and indexation had returned, so did the Olivera- 
Tanzi effect. Tax cheats (despite a renewed effort to 
collect taxes) combined with a decline in economic activity 
to produce a fiscal deficit of 9 percent of GNP. The 
Austral Plan was on the brink of total failure.
HAViatlfll1 £.&!■?. (Fgbruarx..Ma.?.rJ.un£..118?) . a poor man's
Austral Plan, the Australito, as it came to be known, was 
announced on February 25, 1987 and enacted February 25.
The program was to not only institute wage and price 
freezes as a means of combating inertial inflation but 
structural reforms as well. It was the right idea but very 
late in coming.46
Fiscal Policy. With the fiscal deficit at 9 percent of GNP 
it was obvious that the Treasury needed to raise revenues. 
So public utility rates were increased by 2 percent and gas 
and tobacco prices were boosted by 15 percent.
Monetary Policy. The austral was devalued by 7 percent and 
another 2 percent in both May and June of 1987.
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Wage and Price Policy* The price freeze covered everything 
except fruits and vegetables (which had special controls). 
Wages were frozen, but within a certain range. A private 
employee's salary was flexible within a range lx percent, 
while 9 percent was the range for public employees. This 
"flexible freeze" was to remain in effect until July 1.
While these policies temporarily suppressed inertial 
inflation, a series of structural reforms were to go after 
the inflation's source.
First, the state sector was going to be downsized and 
streamlined. Some 20 percent of employees were to be laid 
off over a three year period. A Directorate of Public 
Enterprises was to determine what alternatives would best 
help to implement reform. Several agencies were to be 
restructured, eliminated or combined with others. Some 
state enterprise monopolies (such as the telephone company 
and the state airlines) were to be privatized.
Capital market reform was intended to help break the 
mindset of avoiding long-term gestation projects. To solve 
this problem meant deregulating the banks and expanding the 
stock market, which would serve as an alternative source of 
capital. Hopefully, this would lead to a break from "the 
inflationary process and. • .speculation typical of a 
closed economy . "*7
To open the economy also meant integrating with the 
world market. This would be done with industrial
23
infrastructure modernization (progressive tariff reductions 
and credit-lines for the high tech sector to buy better 
equipment) and signing protocols with other countries. 
Hopefully, outside competition would force Argentine 
industry to become more productive or disappear.
In the four-month freeze period, however, inflation 
was not quelled. At 5.2 percent, the quarterly rate of 
inflation was nearly twice the 3 percent that the 
government had hoped for and the deficit was 6.5 percent 
rather than the projected 4.6 percent. Tax revenues 
remained disappointing and public enterprises were in 
constant need of subsidies.48
Before, Alfonsin*s economic failures had been somewhat 
forgiven because he was shielded by his popular stand 
against the former military regime. For the first time, a 
military, right up to the junta, was held accountable for 
its actions while in power.
But public clamor for retribution had agitated the 
military to the point of outbreaks of rebellion. When 
Alfonsin appeared in one such rebellion to accede to the 
military officers* demands it hurt his image a great deal. 
Worse yet, other rebellions followed.
Unions had been rebellious all along. There were 13 
general strikes in Alfonsin*s 6 years as President.
With gubernatorial and congressional elections coming 
up, things could not have been much worse for the Radicals.
24
Australito had failed outright and one of the reasons for 
it was a lack of public confidence.
In an effort to curry favor with the unions, Carlos 
Alderete (a Peronist) was named Labor Minister.49 This was 
another reason for Australito*s failure: Alderete*s 
appointment led to friction in the Cabinet and opposition 
to wage suppression. Australito had started as a desperate 
attempt to give voters the impression that the government 
had the economy under control, but it ended up as almost 
total failure. Radical popularity kept sliding.
LiberaliMjfclgn..klyly .1&821 * After the
demise of the Australito, the Radical Party was in serious 
trouble at the polls.
With the freeze lifted, Sorrouille launched a salvo of 
various economic measures ranging from the privatization of 
the petrochemical industry to the elimination of wheat 
tariffs.
Structural reforms dealing with restructuring the 
state sector were shelved. It was an election year and 
state employees each had a vote, so rather than lay anyone 
off the government raised transport fees and the gas tax by 
10 percent to make up for shortfalls. State enterprise 
debts (foreign debts in particular) were assumed by the 
Treasury.
The Radicals continued efforts to win over the unions, 
but to no avail. Even with Alderete*s appointment, unions
25
were not won over. The Administration's handling of th 
economy did not impress labor and they were also displc < i 
by new wage-bargaining rules that had been issued as a 
decree law.
After the September 8 defeat of the Radicals, 
Sorrouille and his team of "best and brightest" Ph.D.'s 
tendered their resignations. To paraphrase Luigi Manzetti 
and Marco Dell Aquilla, although Alfonsin refused to accept 
the resignations it was in effect the end of the Austral 
Plan.50
The cruzadoPlan
Background. In Brazil, inertial inflation was believed to 
be the main cause of the country's woes. One Brazilian, 
Francisco Lopes, had been studying the problem of inertial 
inflation and writing on it since the late seventies. He 
was convinced that inertial forces were the economic 
culprit and it would take a "heterodox shock" to purge the 
system.
At about the same time Persio Arida and Andre Lara- 
Resende were coming forward with a proposal to fight 
inflation with an indexed currency. The "Larida" proposal 
suggested introducing second currency, whose value would be 
indexed monthly vis-a-vis the cruzeiro. To do this, the 
new currency would have a value fixed with the Obrigocoes 
Readjustaveis do Tesouro Nacional (ORTN) (the Brazilian
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Treasury*s purchasing power bond unit). If Lopes' price 
freeze is incorporated into this plan then once the public 
had gained confidence in the new currency (and the 
psychological inflationary cycle was broken), the freeze 
could be lifted and the cruzeiro would be done away with? 
replaced completely by the new money.
While the Larida proposal found broad support among 
structuralists some did dissent. Simo. ien, Modiano and 
Carneiro felt that if there was an outbreak of high 
inflation during conversion from cruzeiros, public 
confidence in the new currency would be damaged since it 
would lose some of its value (which would lead to 
reindexation and start the inflationary cycle).51
After the Brazilian Hew Republic took office in March 
1985, it appeared that the economy was on its way to an 
indexed currency proposal. "Price, exchange rates and 
financial asset nominal adjustments became increasingly 
linked to monthly variations in the ORTN. . . . The 
proposals for a new wage policy included. . .adjustments 
every month according to the variation of the ORTN."52
Inflation was at 12 percent a month when President 
Sarney had assumed office and with drought pushing 
agricultural prices up, it looked by January 1986 as if 
inflation may hit 400*500 percent when these increases 
reached the consumer level. Sarney*s support in his own
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political party had never been strong and now it was 
threatening to collapse. He needed to do something.53
Structuralist advocates of the heterodox stabilization 
plan managed to wrest Sarney's ear from the monetarists, 
who advocated the orthodox route to stability (the 
structuralist's success may have been due to the fact that 
the Austral Plan was enjoying its greatest success around 
that time).
Announcement. The Cruzado Plan was announced by Sarney on 
February 28, 1986, in a television address to the nation. 
Decree Law 228354 included the following:
EilSAl-PPUcy. The fiscal policy had actually already been 
announced in December 1985. It divided income tax refunds 
into four installments in an effort to let government hold 
the money longer. Yet the withholdings were cut to give 
workers more take-home pay.
Measures were taken to reduce inflationary erosion of 
government revenues. Large companies had to produce six- 
month income statements.
The exchange rate policy had been established in March 
1985, allowing for daily minidevaluations. Brazil's 
economy was growing and had a good position externally with 
the world market. Under the Cruzado Plan, the exchange 
rate was fixed and the cruzado somewhat undervalued.55
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Mftn.et.ary.Pftligy* The Austral Plan had shown the Cruzado
planners that there would be a pronounced increase in the 
demand for money and willingness to save, so flexibility 
was built in to accommodate for this and keep any abrupt 
changes in economic activity (like higher interest rates) 
under control.
Of course, the increased demand for money would be due 
to the introduction of a new currency, the cruzado (worth 
1000 cruzeiros) which would replace the cruzeiro. The 
cruzado was the centerpiece of the plan and was fixed at Cz 
$13.84 to US $1.00.
Also, government replaced index-linked government 
obligations with a new, non-indexed "Central Bank Bill.”
Wage and Price Policy. According to Werner Baer, this part 
of the plan alone was enough to kill it.
Besides a general price freeze, the Cruzado Plan 
called for wages to be set at the last six-months* average 
plus 8 percent and 15 percent for minimum wage. In 
addition, wages were to automatically increase each time 
the Consumer Price Index accumulated 20 percent from the 
last adjustment.
Indexation of contracts of less than one year (except 
for savings bonds) were prohibited and any existing 
contracts were deindexed. The conversion rate would assume 
a monthly inflation rate for the cruzeiro of 14 percent and 
index it out when converting to cruzados just as the
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Austral Plan deindexed contracts by the 30 percent monthly 
rate Inflation stood at when it was introduced•56
The prohibition of indexation in contracts of less 
than a year probably had to do with the fact that in 
Argentina, allowing indexation to continue with short-term 
contracts had helped fuel inertial inflation's 
resurgence .57
Implementation and Performance* The cruzado Plan was much 
more short-lived than the Austral Plan, lasting only 1 year 
and 3 months and falling into three phases: Disinflation, 
Cruzadinho and Cruzado II.
aijainllftfei an..(March 1236-J une 1 9 M 1  > one thing that set
Brazil apart from other heterodox experiments was that the 
economy was expanding at the time the program was 
instituted. Industrial activity, which had been at 72 
percent of capacity in 1984 was up to 77 percent. By the 
end of 1986 almost 60 percent of industry was working at 
over 90 percent of capacity.58
Why? A consumption boom brought on by the 
government's economic policies was overheating the economy. 
The surge in spending was the result of a real increase in 
wages coupled with a price freeze, lower interest rates, 
lower income tax withholdings and pent-up demand from the 
recent recession.
30
Like in Argentina under the Austral Plan, Brazil's 
businesses were divided into economic winners and losers 
due to the price freeze. Combining this with increased 
consumer demand led to shortages, the most pronounced being 
in meat, milk and cars. With a crucial election coming up 
that would pick the state governments and, more 
importantly, the constituent congress the government went 
about trying to alleviate these difficulties (trying not to 
undermine the overall plan). Milk was subsidized and meat 
imported (since the shortage had been exacerbated by 
seasonal decline). Problems still persisted with meat 
producers and in the end did damage to the public's 
confidence in the government.
New automobiles were frozen at a price so relatively 
cheap that used ones were more expensive. Some elements of 
the public sector were caught with their prices frozen 
below costs, too (electricity was hit worst and needed 
subsidies). Government economists felt it might be time to 
at least readjust prices, but the upcoming election made 
that a political impossibility.59
Tampering with the Cruzado Plan made the government 
apprehensive. It was an extremely popular program for many 
reasons, but the main two were that:
1. It had brought about "zero inflation."60 The 
drop from 22 percent in February 1986 to -1 
percent in March was dramatic. Deflation
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continued into April (-.6 percent) and when 
prices did go up in May and June it was only 
slightly (.3 percent and .5 percent,
respectively). Zero inflation was perceived as 
evidence of stability.61
2. Not only the public's perception of inflation, 
but of itself as well was being taken into 
consideration by the government. After 21 
years of military rule, everyone wanted to 
participate in the new democratic government.
Many took it upon themselves to act as the 
"price police" and make certain no one violated 
the price freeze.62
Sarney wanted to stretch this "era of good feelings" 
as far as he could; hopefully until after the elections. 
For the time being, the Cruzado Plan overstaffed agencies 
and large subsidy programs were to remain untouched, or 
disturbed as little as possible.63
Cruzadinho (July 1986-October1986). The numbers in July 
1986 looked worrisome. The economy was experiencing 
excessive growth.
To quote Eduardo M. Modiano:
Consumer purchases increased 22.8 percent 
in the first six months of 1986 with respect to 
the same period in the previous year. The 
production of consumer durables increased 33.2 
percent during the previous twelve months. The 
open unemployment rate declined from 4.4
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percent in March to 3.8 percent, and real wages 
increased approximately 12 percent from the end 
of February.44
The government was loathe to take action before the 
November elections, but it was decided that some 
accumulated problems needed to be addressed.
Cruzadinho was a pretty "timid fiscal package1' aimed 
at "increasing investment" and "dampening consumption."65 
First, a 30 percent "forced loan" was placed on new cars 
and 28 percent for gasoline. These loans were to be paid 
back after three years but the second measure of the 
Cruzadinho were 25 percent "forced loans" on international 
travel (international airplane tickets and foreign exchange 
for travel) that were nonrefundable.
These loans were intended to encourage investment 
because they were "returned to the consumers of these 
products in the form of equity shares in the National 
Development Fund."66 This fund was intended to be a 
combination of public and private money used to invest in 
various development projects (known as the Plano de Metas) 
with the goal of helping foster 7 percent GNP growth.
These measures did little to promote public confidence 
for two reasons. Revenues for the Plano de Metas fell 
short of what was required and made the whole scheme look 
like a back door approach to fund the burgeoning public 
debt. Also, since the prices of items affected by forced 
loans went up, the government removed them from the basket
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of goods that was used to measure the CPI and thus avoid 
triggering the automatic wage increase mechanism.
What was more important than what the Cruzadinho 
addressed was what it did not address. Prices remained 
frozen despite the distress it was causing some sectors of 
the economy. The price freeze "losers” had been willing to 
be good citizens for a few months, but after 5 months (the 
Cruzadinho was announced July 24, 1986) they were growing 
impatient .6;
Businesses began to come up with clever ways around 
the freeze "by offering new products," cheating on the 
contents of packages, and requiring 'side payments' or 
'premiums.'"68 People were becoming aware of these 
breaches in the freeze and began to anticipate its lifting. 
Consequently (and ironically) this led to a surge in 
consumption with everyone hoping to take full advantage o 
the freeze before its end and defeating the purpose of the 
Cruzadinho.69
In addition, the Cruzadinho did not address the 
external accounts problem. Brazil had had trade surpluses 
since 1983, running about $1 billion a month and 
accumulating an $11 billion foreign exchange reserve. The 
Cruzado Plan began with an undervalued cruzado. Now, due 
to inflation, it was considered increasingly overvalued. 
Much like the end of the price freeze, businessmen began 
anticipating a devaluation to correct the situation. No
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exporters wanted to get caught holding the bag so exports 
began to slow (called an "export strike" by some) and in 
some cases exporters began selling in the more lucrative 
domestic market (shortages in the domestic market also 
fueled imports.) Some felt that a number of exporters 
engaged in such activities as a protest aimed at making the 
government devalue the cruzado.
But government resisted, fearing devaluation would 
lead to inflationary pressure and create an inflation—  
devaluation— inflation cycle. From September 1986 to 
October 1986 export revenue went from $2.1 billion to $1.3 
billion? forcing the government to grudgingly devalue the 
cruzado by 1.8 percent. Many traders felt that the 
currency was still overvalued by 10 percent and government 
wold have to remedy this sooner or later? an attitude which 
led to even more export slowdowns and increased imports.
The 10 percent figure was just an educated guess since 
no one really knew what the actual rate of inflation was. 
What they did know was that with certain goods like 
automobiles excluded, it was nowhere near what the 
government claimed (all this confusion to avoid the 20 
percent wage trigger). And that was how things would stay 
until after November 15. The government did not have the 
stomach for tampering with the economy any further before 
the election. Sarney had resolved to take his revenue
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shortfall lumps for the time being and deal with the harsh 
realities later.
Cru&aflp II-iMgvemfesr IgJBfr-Mav 19171. NOV that the 
government party had von the election, they felt it was 
time to take action. Inflation was not as much of a 
concern to them as the growing public debt so a series of 
measures aimed at increasing government revenues by 4 
percent of GDP at the expense of inflation, called the 
Crusado II, was introduced one week after their victory.
Even though they had just been returned to power, the 
ruling party still had an aversion to raising direct taxes, 
so indirect ones were boosted instead. Automobiles went up 
by 80 percent, cigarettes by 120 percent, alcohol went up 
by 100 percent, sugar by 60 percent. In the public sector 
postal tariffs went up by 80 percent, gasoline 60 percent 
and public utility rates (telephone and electricity 
specifically) were upped 35 percent. While all these 
measures led to an inflationary shock, anticipated 
increases in the near future for steel and milk (a 100 
percent boost on all dairy products) only made matters more 
volatile.70
In addition to cars, cigarettes and beverages were to 
remain out of the CPI equation (the government hoped to 
shave 10 points off of the monthly inflation rate with this 
action). But the public clamor was so great that the 
government recanted. Government was still determined to
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avoid the wage trigger at least partially. It was 
announced that while automatic wage increases were going to 
be triggered in December (due to the inflationary 
explosion), "[t]rigger adjustments would be limited to 20 
percent with the residual carried over to the next 
trigger.1,71
Even without taking the Hside payments" businesses 
were charging into account, inflation had taken off. It 
had been 3.3 percent in November,but by December it was 7.3 
percent. Government seemed aimless on the subject of the 
still ongoing price freeze. While it was not officially 
lifted, businesses took advantage of a loophole in Cruzado 
II to relieve the building inflationary pressure and "the 
overpricing that had become a general disguised practice 
started to be disclosed and revealed by the price 
collection agencies in January 1987.w72 As a result 
inflation rose to 16.8 percent in january, 13.9 percent in 
February, 14 in March, 19 in April and 26 percent in May. 
Inflation was on its way to well over 1000 percent 
annually.
The first wage trigger adjustment was added at the end 
of January, but inflation was moving so quickly it did 
little other than restore some purchasing power lost that 
month.
In February 1987, (February 27 in fact, the day before 
the Plan’s first anniversary) under threats by industry to
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disobey price regulations,the freeze was lifted73 and 
indexation, the supposed culprit of inertial inflation, was 
reinstituted.
To quote Modiano:
[T]he reindexation of the economy, 
initiated in November, was completed with the 
introduction of monthly nominal corrections.
The fixed periodicities for adjustments of the 
old cruzeiro contracts were all renewed except 
for labor contracts [which already had the wage 
trigger]. . . .  Consequently the economy 
became more heavily indexed than on the last 
days of the cruzeiro, which meant that the high 
rates of inflation. . .would continue to 
increase, but at a much faster pace.74
Inflation was so steep that short term interest rates 
were at 2000 percent per annum. As inflation neared the 
"hyper" level indexation of loans began to wreak havoc on 
borrowers.
To quote Baer:
Because inflation is not neutral 
(particular prices rise at different rates), 
borrov/ers have no assurance that their prices 
and incomes will rise as much as the average 
price level on which the indexation is based. . 
• • In any event, interest rates rose high 
enough to cause calamitous problems for many 
enterprises, especially those set up in the 
euphoria following the Cruzado Plan.
Bankruptcy proceedings reached record levels 
throughout Brazil in the first half of 1987.75
Businesses were also hurt by foreign exchange 
difficulties. A mididevaluation was announced in an effort 
to bring the overvalued cruzado more in line with reality.
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Overconsumption in 1986 coupled with a lack of foreign 
currency had led to a shortage of raw materials and 
intermediate products.
The balance of trade problems were not showing any 
signs of letting up and were ultimately leading to a 
foreign currency crisis. Domestically, the market was in 
disarray due to the abrupt lifting of the price freeze and 
uncertainty over the government's future plans. So faced 
with an imminent economic slowdown, a disorganized domestic 
market and a foreign currency reserve crisis, Brazil 
announced a "technical moratorium" on interest payments on 
the foreign debt. The government did this in an effort to 
shore up political support, help alleviate foreign currency 
losses and to get the banks of negotiate.76 In the end 
Brazil accepted a series of IMF missions77 as a condition 
for an earlier rescheduling of its debt payments. The 
Cruzado Plan had reached its inauspicious ending.
Conclusions
One thing the Cruzado and Austral plans had in common 
was that they were both unmitigated disasters. But why?
I am still less than convinced that inertial inflation 
even exists. Werner Baer spoke of how structuralists felt 
inertial inflation would continue under an orthodox 
stabilization program (and in the face of the recession 
such a program would cause)78 and point to continuing
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inflationary pressure in Argentina and Brazil after 
tightening the money supply.
But wait, there is a time laq between expanding the 
money supply and the inflation that ensues. Likewise, 
there is a time lag between tightening monetary growth and 
inflation's decline. Milton Friedman placed this time lag 
at about two years for a low inflation economy and for 
"countries like. . .Brazil. . .or Argentina that have 
experienced much higher and more variable rates of 
inflation, the lag is only a few months."79
The initial shocks in Argentina and Brazil may not 
have given the economy enough time to purge their systems. 
Brazil never actually declared any targets for monetary 
policy, and its disinflation period only lasted five months 
before the inflationary Cruzadinho and Cruzado II phases.
So how does this prove anything? In addition, Argentina's 
tight money still amounted to 7-7.5 percent growth in the 
first quarter of 1986.80 In fairness, there was an 
increasing demand for money at that time but a lot of this 
new money was due to the Central Bank's surreptitious 
financing of the public sector's debts (pure inflation).
The initial shock in Argentina also took place during an 
economic slowdown; so it would probably take a while for 
inflation to cycle itself out and the nine and a half 
months the economy was given simply may not have been 
enough time.
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Policy Crossroads, Both Argentina and Brazil were also 
faced with a crucial decision at the end of their plans* 
first phase. For Argentina (to quote Manzetti and Dell 
*Aquilla):
The first option was to use the 
achievements of the stabilization as a 
springboard to decisively being inflation close 
to U.S.-European levels through tight monetary, 
fiscal and wage policies. The second option 
envisaged a flexible approach, in which 
policies were to limit the rate of inflation to 
moderate levels, without necessarily making 
commitments as to the actual policies to be 
adopted.81
As for Brazil it was a choice between devaluing the 
cruzado, lifting the freeze and taking their chances at the 
polls or stay put, run up huge debts and distort the 
economy for the sake of political expediency.82 Both 
Argentina and Brazil chose the popular route.
They probably did not even really have a choice. For 
the obvious reason that it would be political suicide and 
another is the tremendous difficulty any country would have 
combating inflation in the face 01 the tremendous debt. 
Kiguel said some felt it was next to impossible.83
Inflation and Price Controls. But supposing it could be 
done, should they have chosen tight money and devaluations?
I believe that the first thing that needed to be done 
was, in fact, tightening the money supply even at the risk 
of recession. Price freezes make no economic sense to me
41
and I feel they should have been removed. Consider a pot 
of water on a stove. If you turn on a fire under it, the 
water heats; cause and effect (monetary expansion heats up 
inflation too). The higher the flame, the hotter the water 
gets (just like the fire and water, monetary expansion and 
inflation are positively related). So once the water has 
come to a boil (or the economy experiences hyperinflation), 
what does one do: turn down the fire or put a lid on the 
pot? Putting a lid on the pot does nothing for the cause 
of the problem and makes the effect into a dangerously 
explosive pressure cooker just like price controls subvert 
the market forces of an economy to its detriment.
Carrying this comparison a little further, even 
turning the fire completely off will not cause the water to 
stop boiling immediately. Does this mean that there is 
"inertial boiling" going on or just residual heat from the 
fire?
Should the firo be turned completely off; that is to 
say should a treasury stop expanding the money supply 
altogether? Even the most strident monetarists would say 
no. Instead, the growth in the money supply should try to 
match the growth in the GNP and make for zero inflation.8" 
Zero money growth would mean deflation and recession (no 
fire means cold water, too)•
Problems and Solutions: Debt. But recession would probably 
be inevitable due to the debt crisis. Sorrouille was on
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the right track when he was streamlining the government. 
Some of the money wasted on deadwood could have been used 
to help pay the debt. It is too bad that a lot of that 
debt was incurred for the sake of being squandered by 
military regimes, too. Investment in infrastructure or 
industry would have helped generate capital.
Probably the most important question has two parts:
why did they take out such huge loans and why did the banks
loan it to them to begin with? I could write another paper
on that sub'jcrc but in short I think that the foreign banks
were awash in petrodollars in the 1970's and needed to loan 
them to someone. In addition the interest rates on these 
loans were fixed (indirectly) to the U.S. prime rate so it 
was when the prime rate shot up to 21 percent in 1980 that 
these debts suddenly became unmanageably.8S
In this case, it would appear the overeager banks are 
as much to blame as the debtor nations. I also find it 
ironic that the United States is currently upset at the 
German Bundesbank's high interest rates (to fight German 
inflation) when ten years ago we stiff-armed South America 
with a high prime rate to help reduce double-digit 
inflation here at home.
As Werner Baer has argued, perhaps the U.S. and other 
developed countries should have assumed the debt from the 
banks and given South America a 10-year grace period on 
interest payments and a 25-year grace period on principal
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payments to allow their economies to develop to where they 
could afford to pay.
I wonder if South America would go for this. The last 
time a South American country's debt was assumed by a 
foreign government was in 1902. Venezuela had refused to 
pay English, German and Italian banks which led to their 
respective governments assuming their debts, sending 
gunboats to Venezuela and shelling the place until it found 
the money.®6
Adam Smith's Revenge. Werrer Baer mentioned repeatedly in 
The Brazilian Economy that the real income wage increase 
alone would have killed the Cruzado Plan. The Austral Plan 
had no such raise yet it failed, too.
In the end what it came down to was the dubious 
existence of inertial inflation, which constituted the 
cornerstone of heterodox theory (although I must admit the 
Larida proposal was intriguing and the Latin American 
economy needs structural changes); the dubious wisdom of 
price controls, which only served to kill market signals 
and showed that hiding inflation beneath price controls is 
not a cure; the dubious commitment of the government to 
fiscal discipline, which was evidenced by its back-door 
methods of expanding the money supply and unwillingness to 
make tough, politically unpopular decisions; and finally 
the dubious possibility that a team of technocrats can 
actually plan an economy's recovery.
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The market is such a sophisticated mechanism that even 
King Solomon or an army of King Solomons could not imitate 
it* The total failure of heterodox theory makes for a 
victory for monetarists everywhere* And somewhere, Adam 
Smith is smiling*
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